How and why UNIFIL failed to ‘keep peace’ in Lebanon

During Israel’s most recent invasion of Lebanon, the United Nations peacekeeping force (UNIFIL) based in the country repeatedly come under fire. The Israeli army targeted its headquarters and positions in southern Lebanon, with the UN saying that several attacks were “clearly deliberate”.
Hezbollah was also accused of launching rockets at UNIFIL positions, which caused injuries among peacekeepers.
While UNIFIL itself was under fire, the civilian population in Lebanon was also subjected to indiscriminate attacks by Israel. More than 3,800 people have been killed, including more than 200 children, and more than 15,400 wounded since October 2023.
As yet another Israeli war on Lebanon has taken a painful toll, UNIFIL has clearly failed in its mission to “keep peace”. It is incapable of stopping Israeli aggression and has done little to help the Lebanese authorities maintain control over their southern territory and protect the civilian population. This failure raises important questions about its continuous presence in Lebanon under the new ceasefire announced on November 26.
UNIFIL is one of the largest and longest-running peacekeeping missions in the world. It was created in March 1978 by the UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 in order to: confirm Israel’s withdrawal from Southern Lebanon; restore peace and security; and assist the Lebanese government in regaining control over the area.
Although UNIFIL was supposed to protect the civilian population and was given the right to use weapons to defend itself, it was not empowered to use force to fulfil its mandate. Throughout its existence, its troops have not returned any fire directly at Israel in any of its aggressions against Lebanon.
After the 2006 war, UNIFIL force was increased from 2,000 to 15,000 soldiers and its mandate was expanded to include disarming all non-state entities in Lebanon. Given that Hezbollah continues to have access to weapons, it is clear that UNIFIL has failed to implement that aspect of its mandate, as well.
The inability of UNIFIL to protect itself, let alone Lebanese civilians from Israeli aggression has had deadly consequences throughout the years. In 1987, an Israeli tank fired at a UNIFIL observation post and killed an Irish peacekeeper, which the Irish army perceived to be a deliberate attack.
During Israel’s assault on southern Lebanon in 1996, the Israeli army targeted a UNIFIL Fijian battalion base in Qana, killing more than 100 civilians, including at least 37 children, and four UNIFIL soldiers. Some 800 civilians had sought refuge at the base, hoping they would be safe from Israeli attacks under UN protection.
International outrage over the massacre forced Israel to end its assault on Lebanon. However, many contributing countries continued to send their troops to South Lebanon and maintain normal relations with Israel.
Ten years later, in the July 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, UNIFIL once again came under direct fire from Israel. As concluded by the Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon, UN positions were targeted 30 times in the course of the 34-day war and all attacks were unjustified. Among the incidents was an Israeli air strike on a UNIFIL base in Al-Khiyam which killed four unarmed UN observers.
In the years leading up to 2023, Israel continuously demonised UNIFIL, accusing it of working for Hezbollah, covering up its tunnels and tracks, and overlooking the movement of weapons. Through such attacks, Israel aimed to delegitimise UNIFIL, providing a pretext for more violent attacks to come.
UNIFIL troop-contributing countries had plenty of time to re-evaluate the risk they were putting their peacekeepers in. Instead of holding Israel accountable for its violence, they continued to put their soldiers in the line of fire.
As UNIFIL failed to protect civilians from Israeli aggression, local communities in the south developed sometimes tenuous relations with the force. These dynamics depend somewhat on the nationality of a certain battalion and the denomination of the community, where it is deployed. European troops have been overwhelmingly perceived as spies for Israel, especially by the Shia population, which has endured the worst of Israel’s occupation and violence and has witnessed UNIFIL’s passivity and inability to provide protection.
It is of note that UNIFIL, compared with other peacekeeping missions, has the highest number of European soldiers. Almost 40 percent of UNIFIL’s troops come from European countries, such as Italy, France and Spain.
In my years travelling to the south, I have been told numerous times that there was “no reason” to study UNIFIL because clearly, they are “a weapon for Israel” or “spies”.
“As long as Israel exists there, they’ll continue to exist here,” a Lebanese worker employed by the UNIFIL told me. Many share this sentiment and ask: if UNIFIL has been unable to fulfil its objectives, why has it stayed in the south?
Part of the reason for this mistrust is that some UNIFIL contingents have used aid to try to penetrate local communities. Given the devastation Israel has repeatedly wrought on the south and the general neglect by the central government in Beirut, villages and towns have struggled to rebuild and develop.
After the 2006 war, UNIFIL started implementing so-called “quick impact projects “(QIPs), which have delivered much-needed help to these communities. But some of these initiatives have also caused more resentment because they have been made conditional.
Villages and towns, for example, where the mayor is publicly supportive of the resistance, would not receive such aid; the same would go for public institutions, such as schools. When communities are granted QIPs, they are expected to be “grateful” and allow UNFIL greater access to carry out surveillance in their areas.
In 2023, I attended one event organised by UNIFIL to celebrate the donation of solar panels by an Italian contingent to a village outside Naqoura and was able to observe some of UNIFIL’s interactions with locals firsthand.
We, the attendees, were given juice and some cookies and then asked to take a seat in neatly arranged rows of chairs. We had to move up several times so that we could fill up the front seats. There were armed soldiers standing all around us and cameras in our faces, capturing the celebration.
An Italian general spoke to the audience in Italian and had an Arabic interpreter translate. During his speech, he invoked Allah, then Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), and then Imam Ali, reminding the audience that each taught them the importance of gratitude. Each invocation sent the crowd into prayers.
After the event was over, the men from the village were rounded up to pose for a photo. None of the villagers seemed especially thankful or excited for the solar panels donated to the municipality. While these solar panels were no doubt useful, they also enabled UNIFIL to better patrol and surveil the roads.
Another conditional QIP I came across was carried out by a French battalion at a school in a village near Tyre. The principal told me that there were two conditions for French help with repairs for the school: the school leadership could not have any affiliation with an armed group and it had to allow UNIFIL to enter its premises, observe and teach their own courses.
While some of UNIFIL’s classroom lessons were supposed to focus on foreign languages, others were not as benign. In one course, French soldiers talked to Muslim elementary school students about brotherhood between all monotheistic religions, emphasising a religious kinship between Jews and Muslims. UNIFIL’s intervention in the curriculum sought to neutralise the struggle between Lebanon and Israel by painting it as an issue of religious misunderstanding rather than one of resistance and occupation.
The school principal, who was clearly uncomfortable with UNIFIL’s interference, told me, “I find ways to deter them from wanting to enter the school regularly because I can’t tell them no. I make up excuses, I say that our schedule just doesn’t allow, that we are too busy … whatever I can find.”
These dynamics I observed during my fieldwork reflect probably the only achievement UNIFIL has made since its creation in 1978: it has managed to become a governing-like entity that uses much-needed aid as a means to pacify the civilian population.
UNFIL clearly does not have the trust of the local Lebanese population or the respect of the Israeli authorities. It is a peacekeeping force that has failed to protect civilians and stop violence.
A ceasefire has now been announced that will focus on implementing UNSC Resolution 1701 and keeping the territory between the border with Israel and the Litani River free from Hezbollah presence.
This means that UNIFIL’s mandate will likely be expanded, and so will its funding and the number of personnel deployed. However, such changes are unlikely to make it a more effective peacekeeping force.
This is because UNIFIL will continue to be incapable of protecting the Lebanese population from Israeli aggression. It is not possible to “keep peace” in Lebanon because there is no peace in the shadow of occupation.
The country cannot achieve peace while Israel continues to violate its sovereignty and target its civilian population. Only a just resolution to the Palestinian question, the upholding of the rights of the Palestinians, and respect for the sovereignty of Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and Jordan can lead to peace.
The Israeli political elite has made it clear that it will do everything and anything to avoid peacemaking in Lebanon and elsewhere. So what can be done?
This new ceasefire can be an opportunity to rethink “peacekeeping” efforts in Lebanon. If UNIFIL’s mandate cannot be expanded to protect Lebanese civilians, then the troop-contributing countries, especially the European states, which have more political sway with Israel, have to start holding it accountable for its violations and crimes. They must reconsider their diplomatic and trade ties with the Israeli state, which has and will continue to target their peacekeepers.
Only by enforcing accountability can the international community put enough pressure on Israel to stop its aggressive behaviour and commit to peace.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.